This paper examines social interactions when social networking may be endogenous. It employs a linear-quadratic model that accommodates contextual effects and endogenous interactions, that is local ones where individuals react to the decisions of their neighbors, and global ones, where individuals react to the mean decision in the economy, both with a lag. Unlike the simple V AR(1) form of the structural model, the planner's problem involves intertemporal optimization and leads to a system of linear difference equations with expectations. It also highlights an asset-like property of socially optimal outcomes in every period which helps characterize the shadow values of connections among agents. Endogenous networking is easiest to characterize when individuals choose weights of social attachment to other agents. It is much harder to do so when networking is discrete. The paper also poses the inverse social interactions problem, that is whether it is possible to design a social network whose agents' decisions will obey an arbitrarily specified variance covariance matrix.
In most of the empirical work on social interactions, the interactions one tries to analyze and identify econometrically are of a mean-field type: it is assumed that individual agents are influenced by the average behavior of the social group to which they belong. Researchers who employ linear reaction functions, which accommodate well neighborhood effects as additive terms expressing average behavior within an individual's social group, may readily justify their use by appeal to quadratic utility functions. This is the case, for instance, with Bisin et al. (2004) and Glaeser and Scheinkman (2001) . Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) use this assumption as a starting point for many of their results. Such reliance on a broad class of mean field models, that is models where the neighborhood effect is modelled as the mean of the decisions, or actions, or expectations thereof, of one's neighbors has detracted attention from other features of social interactions, as individuals' deliberate efforts to acquire desirable, or avoid undesirable, social connections. Zanella (2004) and Ioannides and Zabel (2002) explicitly model group membership but the groups or neighborhoods they specify are non-overlapping and within the neighborhood, mean-field type interactions are assumed.
Promising is the nascent experimental literature on network formation (see Kosfeld, 2004 , for a survey). In these studies, the focus is on the evolution of networks in rather stylized small scale games.
The present paper differs from other approaches to endogenous group formation by its emphasis on the network structure associated with the social groups which result from individuals' initiatives to link with others, social networking. The paper also aims at investigating the link between social networking and social interactions when the patterns of social interactions may be more complex than the mean field case. If individuals in choosing their own actions are affected by social interdependence but do not react strategically to it, individual outcomes may be restricted with respect to the universe of social outcomes that may reached.
Patterns of interdependence may also reflect self-selection associated with individuals' choice of groups.
The particular approach adopted by this paper is in part motivated by the desire to explore in greater depth social settings where some individuals may be more "influential" than others, and that within groups, subgroups or cliques of agents exist with more intense mutual interaction. Ballester et al. (2004) have pursued related issues in the context of patterns of crime and social interactions. A natural question to pose pertains to the potential for econometric identification when observational data may be used to make inferences about interaction topology (also referred in the literature as network geography or morphology) along with individuals' behavioral parameters. Furthermore, individuals may be subject to both local and global interactions. When individuals choose their own actions but recognize social interdependence, individual outcomes may be limited with respect to the variety of social outcomes that may reached, which also reflect unobservable random shocks. Such limits may also be related to self-selection associated with individuals' choice of groups. A key consequence of social interactions in modelling social phenomena is that even if individuals are subject to random shocks that are independent, their individual reactions may end up being stochastically dependent, precisely because individual reactions reflect influences from others directly, because one's own actions reflect those of others, or indirectly, because one's own actions reflect characteristics of others that influence behavior. Interdependence may also follow from the fact individuals take deliberate efforts to form social groups [ Moffitt (2001) ].
When association with others is valuable, it is also appropriate to wonder about existence of markets through which such "social networking" may be mediated. In fact, networking markets appear to be thriving sometimes and not so much at other times, at least according to the popular press; see, for example, Rivlin (2005a; 2005b) . Creation of such markets is conceptually related to completing asset markets in an economy, an intuition which is also explored by the paper.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The paper first introduces a model of individual decisions that allows for local and global interactions. The model allows for the full range of social interactions with continuous outcomes, as they have been formalized by a number of researchers, including notably Manski (1993; 2000) , Brock and Durlauf (2001) , Moffitt (2001) , and others in the economics literature. Suitable specification of such interactions makes it possible to express a rich variety of patterns of social interdependence that may have important consequences in the context of the life cycle model as well, along the lines of earlier research by Binder and Pesaran (1998; 2001) . The relationship of this paper to those earlier works will be clarified further below. We employ the model first in a static setting, which allows us to explore its implications for interdependence of individual outcomes in the long run. This development allows us to examine the "inverse social interactions" problem, that is whether or not an arbitrary social outcome, that is one that has been defined as a random vector with a given probability distribution, may be reached as a limit state of social interactions in the long run.
Next the paper turns to investigation of the range of social outcomes that may be reached when individuals choose deliberately the social groups to which they belong. We explore the literature in neighborhood choice and in formation of friendships in articulating different possibilities that may result in sorting in terms of observables or of unobservables. We allow for individuals' social groups to evolve over time and contrast two extreme possibilities. One is associated with individuals' being influenced by an evolving set of acquaintances, starting by the acquaintances of their acquaintances and so on, as we let social distance increase.
In an extreme version of the model, this evolution happens exogenously [ c.f. Brueckner and Smyrnov (2004) ]. Another is the outcome of deliberate social networking. Finally, we examine social networking from the point of view of a process of completion of markets. In all of these cases, individual choice affects the dispersion of stochastic interdependence. We exploit similarities between the motivation that individuals have for social networking and the incentives to fully share risks.
Preferences
We endow each individual with the simplest possible form of utility function, that is quadratic, which implies functional forms for the endogenous variables that are linear and therefore sufficiently flexible for allowing for all of the effects we are interested in. The social interactions structure, or topology, is defined in terms of the adjacency matrix Γ of the graph of social interactions G among i = 1, . . . , N individuals as follows:
1 if i and j are neighbors in G;
The adjacency matrix will be time-subscripted when appropriate. Note that the social interactions are assumed to be undirected, and therefore the adjacency matrix Γ is symmetric.
We define as an individual's neighborhood as the set of other agents she is connected with in the sense of the adjacency matrix, j ∈ ν(i), ∀j, Γ ij = 1. We allow individual i at time t to have taste over the mean characteristics of her neighbors
Xφ, and over her neighbors' mean characteristics interacted with their own decision, 1 |νt(i)| Γ i,t Xθy it . These may be referred to as total and marginal contextual effects, for the following reason: the former enters the value of the utility function only, and the latter the first order condition for the respective decision. In the social interactions literature, contextual effects are typically construed as affecting decisions only.
We allow individual i at time t to have taste over her neighbors' decisions interacted with her own characteristics,
This implies endogenous effects in utility functions and correlated effects in decisions.
We also allow for taste over the divergence between an individual's current decision and the mean decision among all individuals in the previous period, y it −ȳ t−1 , and over the square of the divergence between an individual's current decision that the mean decision among her neighbors in the previous period,
The former implies endogenous global interactions and the latter endogenous local interactions. Both mitigate in favor of conformism, if β g , β > 0. Yet, the fact that individual characteristics differ, at equilibrium they imply a tradeoff.
Finally, we allow for an individual's own marginal utility to depend separately on own characteristics, through a term x i αy it , and on a stochastic shock, ε it , which will be discussed in further detail below. Lagging the effect of neighbors' decisions, while keeping the contemporaneous neighborhood structure, is analytically convenient but not critical. We discuss below in more detail the consequences of including contemporaneous effects of neighbors' decisions. So, summarizing we have that individual i's utility in period t is given by:
where α, θ, φ, denote parameter vectors with the appropriate dimensionality, ω a scalar parameter, and β g , β denote scalar global and local social interactions parameters, respectively.
As we see shortly below, some of these terms do not contribute to individuals' reaction functions, but they affect the utility an individual derives from associating with particular other individuals and therefore her welfare. This allows for social effects in the endogenous social networking process. The above specification of the utility function nests a number of existing approaches in the literature, including Durlauf (2004) , Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) , Scheinkman (2004), and Weinberg (2004) .
It differs from the general formulation of the social interactions problem by Binder and Pesaran (1998; 2001) in the following ways. First, Binder and Pesaran (1998) 
where δ, 0 < δ < 1, is the rate of time preference and individual utility is given by (2). The assumption is made that the decision maker knows her neighbors' actual decisions as of time period t − 1. However, we note that individual i in deciding on her plan recognizes that y it enters U i,t+1 in addition to U i,t only if β g = 0. That is due to the fact that although y it enters period t + 1 utilities, it does so only for the utility functions of all agents j, other than agent i, j = i, as γ ii = 0, and the term Γ i,t+1 Y t does not contain y it . If β g = 0, then y it enters through its effect on the average social outcome in period t,ȳ t , which enters
there are no intertemporal links and the optimal decisions in static dynamic settings do not differ.
Differentiating utility function U it according to (2) with respect to y it yields the first order condition:
The interdependencies between individuals' decisions are clearer when the first order conditions for all individuals are put concisely in matrix form. In the remainder of this section, we simplify by setting β g = 0 so as to eliminate the global social interactions effect but return to the more general formulation later on. In matrix notation we have the following VARX(1,1) model:
where 
and
is a column N −vector of individual and contextual effects that would be time-varying if the adjacency matrix is time-varying.
The evolution of social outcomes are fully described by (5), provided that the sequence of adjacency matrices Γ t , t = 0, 1, . . . , are specified. We work first with the case when they are specified so exogenously and return below to the case where they are the outcome of individuals' decisions. The economy evolves as a Nash system of social interactions that adapts to external shocks of two types, deterministic ones, as denoted by the evolution of the social structure Γ t , and stochastic ones, as denoted by the vectors of shocks ε t , as
To fix ideas, let us assume that the random vectors ε t , t = 1, . . . , are normally and identically distributed over time with mean 0 and variance covariance matrix Q, ε t ∼ N (0, Q).
Then, by standard results from stochastic systems theory [ Kumar and Varaiya (1986), p. 27 ] the t−step transition probability and thus the solution at time t is well defined. We summarize by means of the following proposition. 
where A t is the N × N matrix defined as:
and the variance covariance matrix Σ t|0 above is given from the time-varying linear difference equation:
Σ k+m|k is the mean-squared error of the m-step predictor Y t at t = 0. It is straightforward to interpret (6) in the context of social interactions. Given a starting point of the economy, Y 0 , the state after t periods is determined by the fact that in each period an individual's decision reflects the decisions of her neighbors in the previous period, whose own decisions reflect those of their own neighbors two periods ago, and so on.
It is straightforward to generalize Proposition 1 in a number of ways. First, we may generalize the assumption that the random vectors ε t are independent draws from a given multivariate distribution and instead assume that they are defined in terms of factor loadings,
where G is an N × M mixing matrix and w t an random column M −vector, that is independently and identically distributed over time and obeys a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance covariance matrix R, w t ∼ N (0, R). This case is of particular interest, because it allows us to express the contemporaneous stochastic shock in a factor-analytic form of contemporaneously interdependent components and therefore shocks to different individuals may be correlated. 4
4 Alternatively, and more general, one could assume that the disturbances are generated according a MA(q) process
where the Ht's are N ×N matrices and wt a random N -vector that is independently and identically distributed with mean zero and nonsingular covariance matrix
This approach also allows for a general form of serial correlation in the w t s [ ibid., p. 27 ].
The factor-analytic approach links social interaction models with factor models in large crosssections of time series that have been employed in generalizing the dynamic index models of business cycle research. 5
Second, the stochastic shocks do not need to be Gaussian. As long as second moments exist, the counterpart of (7) may be derived.
Third, we may generalize the model and interpret A t as a decision variable that contributes to individual outcomes, as modelled in Equ. (5), that is that A t may assume the form of closed-loop control and therefore could reflect the state of the economy as of time t − 1. In the engineering stochastic control literature, the evolution of the state of the economy, the counterpart of Equ. (5), is assumed to be in the form
A t , B t are given matrices and the vector A t , the control, is optimally chosen so as to optimize an objective, which also includes a quadratic term in A t . The optimal control, in this case, is defined through a matrix that satisfies an algebraic Riccati equation [ Bertsekas (1995) ,
Fourth, we may also generalize the model so that it may allow for substitutability versus complementarity between agents' outcomes [Binder and Pesaran (1998; 2001) ]. These lead to first order conditions that involve expectations of contemporaneous and lead outcomes of others as well as of one's own. We eschew such a more general treatment in order to emphasize the more general mathematical structure that does turn out to characterize the planner's problem in our setting, as we shall see further below.
Dispersion of Social Outcomes
The asymptotic behavior of the variance covariance matrix of the outcome vector, according to Equ. (5), is well understood. If the adjacency matrix Γ i,t is time-invariant, then so is A = βDΓ, and the limit of the variance covariance matrix Σ t , as t → ∞, Σ ∞ , Equ. (7), exists. Theorem (3.4), in Kumar and Varaiya, op. cit., or Proposition 4.1, in Bertsekas, op. cit., as a special case, ensure that if matrix A is stable then the limit solution of (7) is a unique positive semidefinite matrix. Put succinctly in a proposition, we have:
Proposition 2. The variance covariance matrix of the state of the economy when t → ∞, that is the limit of (7) when ε t assumes the factor-analytic form according to (8) satisfies
5 See Reichlin (2002) for an excellent review of this recent literature.
The matrix Σ ∞ in the equation above would not be a proper variance covariance matrix unless it is positive definite. This is ensured, provided the random error w t along with the matrix A "allow" the economy to reach all social outcomes in a well-defined sense. The proposition that follows involves the concept of controllability. That is, a pair of matrices Proof. Matrix A is indeed stable. Since A comes from an adjacency matrix, "normalized"
by each row sum and scaled by β , its stability is ensured by assuming 0 < β < 1. Then, Theorem (3.9), in Kumar and Varaiya, op. cit., applies. Alternatively, by applying Equ. (10) recursively we have that if
It then follows that stability of matrix A is necessary and sufficient for the existence of Σ ∞ .
Q.E.D.
The interpretation of the condition for controllability is quite revealing in our context. If
has rank N , that is all its rows are fully independent, then there exists a sequence of vectors
w t , which take the social outcome from an arbitrary initial point at time 0,
The existence of vector Y * rests on the invertibility of A.
We can demonstrate the existence of a sequence of vectors As noted above, the properties that we have discussed so far really pertain to a sequence of static problems that evolve over time. A number of straightforward generalizations that imply intertemporal tradeoffs can render it genuinely dynamic. The simplest possible one would be to allow for a global effect, that is by allowing β g = 0. Yet another modification would be to make A t an endogenous variable that enters the individual's utility function, as discussed above. This would make this problem conform to the textbook case of the linear-quadratic stochastic control problem, although the social interactions part is clearly absent from those formulations. However, an even more interesting extension would be to allow for the stochastic shocks to be decision variables. The simplest way to do so would be via endogenizing the factor loadings, that is by letting individuals set the elements of the mixing matrix in Equ. (8) , G, which could also be time-varying. This would then resemble a dynamic portfolio analysis problem, which we know to be quite tractable when individuals' utility functions are quadratic. We note the special interpretation that the choice of a portfolio of factors would confer: individuals choose factor loadings in order to offset shocks associated with the decisions of others that enter directly their own utility functions and therefore their own decisions as well.
Social interactions are present in the work by Binder and Pesaran (1998; 2001) , whose results we may contrast with the above analysis. We postpone such extensions for later papers. We turn next to an in depth exploration of the consequences of social interactions in this problem. One is by means of the inverse social interactions problem. A second is by means of a social planner's problem in a dynamic setting, who not only recognizes the interdependence of agents but also takes it into consideration in setting individuals' outcomes while respecting the topology of social interactions. This analysis helps assess the scope for social intermediation, as we shall see shortly below.
The Inverse Social Interactions Problem
Suppose that a desirable but otherwise arbitrarily chosen state of the economy may be designated via a random N −vector Y, with a specified distribution. In particular, let Y, have mean and a variance covariance matrix are specified: Y ∼ N (F, ς) . The inverse social interactions problem is defined as whether such a state could be reached as an outcome of social interactions, that is as the limit vector of social outcomes, satisfying (5), when t → ∞.
That is, given (F, ς) and the distributional characteristics of the random vector of factors w t , w t ∼ N (0, R), can we find a social interactions structure, defined by a vector of coefficients A, an adjacency matrix Γ, and a mixing matrix G of dimension N ×M, such that the random vector Y is the limit of the vector of individual outcomes, Y t , This result is readily interpretable in terms of weighted adjacency matrices. Imposing the restriction that the social interaction matrix takes the form of a matrix of zeros and ones, with A = βDΓ, translates to the requirement that given ς, a matrix Γ and a social interactions coefficient β may be found that provide sufficient spanning for ς to be the limit distribution satisfying Equ. (10). Relaxing the requirement would be to allow for individuals' interaction coefficients to differ, (β 1 , . . . , β N ), or alternatively, for the adjacency matrix to assume a weighted form with arbitrary positive entries, instead of just 0s and 1s. The case of a weighted adjacency matrix is taken up further below in section 6.1.
Dynamic Model: The Planner's Problem
Next, we assume that there exists a planner who seeks to maximize the sum of individuals' expected lifetimes utilities. 6 The planner is forward-looking and in recognizing individuals' interdependence she respects the existing social structure and conditions her decisions on the information available as of the beginning of every time period. At the beginning of each period t, the planner chooses {Y t , Y t+1 , . . . , } so as to maximize the expectation of individuals' lifetime utility, according to
The planner's maximization assumes actual outcomes as of time period t and the exogenous evolution of the adjacency matrix Γ t , and where we have also simplified utility function (2) by assuming that β g = 0, ω = 0.
Differentiating objective function (13) with respect to y it , i = 1, . . . , N, yields the first order conditions:
We may rewrite these conditions for all i's in matrix form as follows:
By working in the standard fashion for linear-quadratic rational expectations models, we solve for Y t as a function of Y t−1 and of E {Y t+1 |t} . Specifically, we simplify by assuming that the adjacency matrix and the matrix of contextual effects are time invariant, and define:
Then solving Equ. (15) yields:
By advancing the time subscript, taking expectations and using the law of iterated expectations, we may express E {Y t+1 |t} in terms of Y t and E {Y t+2 } , and so on. That is:
By iterating forwards from time t + 1, we obtain the standard form of the forward solution for systems of linear rational expectations models. Put concisely in the form of a proposition 
is well defined and unique.
The economic interpretation of Equ. (17) is straightforward. At the steady state, the vector of expected outcomes is equal to the vector of contextual effects, of the own lagged feedbacks, and of the net "conformist" effect on one's neighbors in the following period.
Precise results regarding the properties of the solution to the above model may be obtained by applying Proposition 3, Binder and Pesaran (1998) . We plan to return to this issue in a later version of the paper. We do note that a richer behavioral model in Section 3, while possible and attractive, would have complicated considerably the use we make of our behavioral model later on in the paper.
A number of remarks are in order. Second, by employing the methods used earlier and summarized in Proposition 1 above, it is possible to extend Proposition 4 so as to clarify the evolution of the variance-covariance matrix for the socially optimal outcomes vector.
Third, iterating forwards demonstrates an asset-like property of socially optimal period t outcomes, Y t . That is, the value from setting an individual's outcomes in this period depends upon others' outcomes next period, and so on. This confers an element of asset to agents' outcomes and leads to an asset theory of social interactions. At the social optimum, individual outcomes at time t reflect the present value of the future stream of contextual effects of all current and future neighbors, adjusted by discount factors that are functions of the rate of time preference multiplied by the social interactions coefficient and weighted by the directness of the connections between agents. It is not surprising that the planner is forward looking in assessing the effects that different individuals' actions have on their own outcomes and those of their neighbors. The one period forward dependence is, of course, translated into the standard infinitely forward dependence familiar from rational expectations models.
Fourth, we note that there is another aspect of the social value of social interactions which the effect discussed above does not capture. That is, the value for an agent of having versus not having a particular connection with another agent. Associated with every solution path is an expected value of the social welfare function, the planner's objective function. Therefore, in principle, we may assess the impact of a change in the adjacency matrix on the socially optimal solution and thus on the expected value of the planner's objective function. That is, adding a new link changes the solution path in a particular way and produces an increment in the expected value of the planner's objective function. In general, this yields a shadow value for the corresponding link which is a benchmark by means of which we may measure the value of intermediation. This calculation is straightforward conceptually. In practice, it is quite tedious to compute the social value of an additional connection.
Since the individually optimal outcomes are inefficient, the social optimum may be implemented, at least conceptually, through an appropriately chosen set of prices, π it , i = 1, . . . , N.
By adapting individual i's utility so as to include a term
brings about the social optimum, provided that the prices are set equal to the respective marginal social effects, which in view of quadratic utility functions are equal to the difference between the socially optimal and individually optimal outcomes.
So far we have assumed that the network of social connections is given. We next turn to the situation where this network is endogenous. In that case, implementing individual prices π it in general is insufficient as a tool for the social planner to implement the social optimum of outcomes and network connections.
Endogenous Networking
How could new social network connections come about? In principle, they could be initiated by means of individuals' initiatives, if individuals stand to benefit by doing so. We examine endogenous networking in two ways. The first assumes that individuals choose weights which they attach to their connections with other individuals. This approach assuages the inherent difficulty of dealing with discrete endogenous variables at the cost of a less intuitive weighted social connection. Still, a weighted adjacency matrix is used in the social science literature. 7
The second way returns to the setting of intrinsic discreteness of the model of social connections we have been working with so far. It is intuitively appealing for this reason, but has the drawback that it is cumbersome as a tool of deliberate networking. As we see below in section 6.2, characterization of individual networking initiatives is quite awkward, and so is the associated welfare analysis.
Analysis of endogenous networking is facilitated by assuming a finite horizon, T, version of the typical individual's problem and considering the networking decision prior to period setting the period T outcome. The impact on utility in period T is easier to obtain when we work with the indirect utility function, given a network topology. Setting y iT so as to maximize the expectation of period T utility,
yields an indirect utility function for agent i :
This expression for the utility function will be central in our comparison of continuous (or weighted) networking with discrete networking that follows next.
Endogenous Continuous (Weighted) Networking
A network of connections among N individuals is defined by means of a N × N weighted adjacency matrix Γ, of intensities of social attachment:
This formulation combines the notion of an adjacency matrix in graphs with the notion of varying intensities of social contacts and at the same time allows for the network to be directed. We note that a formulation where individuals choose the intensities of social attachment amounts, in effect, to neighborhood choice. An individual chooses which individuals to be influenced by under the assumption that she optimizes her own outcome for any given social structure. 8
It is very convenient that all previous derivations in the paper so far apply to the case of a weighted adjacency matrix, except for the fact that we may ignore normalizing by the size of neighborhood.
We explore the consequences of endogenous weighted networking by considering the problem of maximizing individual i's expected period T utility with respect
so as to maximize expected indirect utility for period T, according to (19). The results are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5. The indirect utility function (19) for individual i is concave with respect to
Γ i,T , individual i'
s vector of social weights. It admits a unique maximum with respect to
Proof. By differentiating (19) twice with respect to Γ i,T yields the Hessian,
, which is negative semidefinite. This ensures concavity. Therefore, the first order conditions,
characterize the unique maximum, provided that it lies in the interior of the positive orthant of R N , γ ij,T ≥ 0, j = 1, . . . , N, a convex set. Otherwise, it lies on the boundary, that is, some weights are chosen to be equal to zero. Q.E.D.
Under our assumptions, the solution for individuals' optimal weights depends on the actual state of the economy as of the preceding period, Y T −1 and is therefore random.
Consequently, endogenous weighted networking implies that agents in setting their period T − 1 decisions must take into consideration that Γ T , the social adjacency matrix in period T, is an outcome of individuals' uncoordinated decisions and stochastic. Some additional consequences deserve emphasis. This dependence of the social adjacency implies that a intertemporal linkage is introduced in the individual's decision making for two reasons: first, period T − 1 decisions affect the period T adjacency matrix Γ T ; and second, unlike when the adjacency matrix was taken as given and the assumption was made that all diagonal terms were equal to zero, γ ii,t = 0, now they may well be nonzero, thereby introducing habit formation into the model. From a psychological perspective, one can argue whether positive γ ii,t 's should be interpreted as the result of willful acts or are expressing addiction.
This intertemporal linkage in turn leads to a clarification of the asset value of a connection between agents. Because of our functional specification for individual utility according to Equ. (2), additional information, in the form of total and marginal contextual effects, is brought to bear upon the problem of determining the social structure and also enters the asset value of social connections. Third, once the connection weights are endogenized, it is not necessarily the case that weights are equal, that is the adjacency matrix is symmetric, let alone constant over time.
We refrain from pursuing further these issues in the present version of the paper. However, in an important sense, networking, once it has been endogenized no longer implies that social interactions assume the form of the mean field case.
Endogenous Discrete Networking
We consider next the problem of individual i at time t = T − 1, who is contemplating a networking initiative, denoted by the matrix [∆Γ T ], prior to setting the period T decision.
The resulting network topology is given by:
We simplify derivation of the impact of networking by considering first its effect in the last period of a finite horizon version of the problem of individuals' lifetime utility maximization.
This does not impose any undue restrictions because individually optimal outcomes satisfy conditions which are backward looking.
Since networking is defined in terms of the entries of the adjacency matrix, which are discrete variables, the contribution of different networking initiatives to optimum utility may now be defined in terms marginal but discrete changes, [∆Γ ij ] to the adjacency matrix. 
where the quantity D ik,T is defined as follows:
These definitions may be applied symmetrically for the networking decisions contemplated by individual k. Consequently,
These definitions along with the transition functions (23), suitably adapted for all agents, define convex sets in R N which describe fully the motion of the system at any point in time.
So, we summarize the networking decisions of all agents by stating that: (19), we have that remaining expected lifetime utility becomes:
Individual i chooses her period T − 1 networking, ∆Γ i,T −1 , given Γ i,T −2 and prior to the realization of that period's shocks, and plans to choose ∆Γ i,T , given Γ i,T −1 so as to maximize the optimum value of remaining expected utility. Although individual i ignores the effects that her own actions have on the utilities of others, she still needs to form expectations about the effects of networking by others on the entire pattern of social interactions and therefore on her own utility. These considerations suggest that the economy's adjacency matrix in the following period is to be regarded as random. However, the dynamic programming formulation may still be used, but in the context of the classic optimal control literature, the system matrix becomes stochastic [ Bertsekas (1995) , p. 141 ].
We have considered so far the consequences of only a single networking initiative by each agent. Since the indirect utility function, defined in (19) is quadratic in Γ, the impacts of deliberate networking with various other agents, which is initiated by individual i and described according to (24), may be ranked. With the assumption of utility costs of forming new connections, which additional connections each agent will undertake is fully determined, and so is the law of motion for the evolution of the patterns of social interactions in the economy. We summarize by stating that
where the function L(·) summarizes the above results.
A number of remarks are in order. First, we note that although the law of motion (28) is stated in terms of quantities that are known as of time t, the evolution of the state of the economy over time depends on realizations of shocks in every period. Second, although the contribution to agent i's utility from opening up a connection with agent k is defined symmetrically to the contribution to agent k's utility from opening up a connection with agent i, those two different contributions need not both have the same sign. This raises the possibility that opening and severing of connections would cycle, unless we impose the condition that directly affected agents must be in mutual agreement. However, presence of costs does introduce friction, which mitigates some of these issues. Third, an extension of the model would be to allow individual the option of initiating contacts with others according to a Poisson clock in the style of Blume (1993).
Comparison with Exogenous Networking
As a contrast to exogenous networking, consider a stylized exogenous networking setting where individuals engage in social networking by progressively connecting with the acquaintances of their acquaintances, and so on. Tracking the evolving acquaintance sets is quite straightforward [ Brueckner and Smyrnov (2004) ]. Starting with an adjacency matrix Γ 0 , it is straightforward to see that all individuals acquire connections with their second neighbors, that is the acquaintances of their acquaintances, then the adjacency matrix becomes
Extending to third neighbors (graph-distance three), the adjacency matrix becomes
Endogenous networking as examined earlier would lead only by chance to such a description of the evolution of networking at the aggregate. Brueckner and Smyrnov (2004) derive a number of results for the case in which Γ 0 is irreducible, that is, in networks in which every agent is directly or indirectly connected to every other agent. Notwithstanding the tractability of the network evolution process, one drawback of this approach is that it is hard to come up with an economic justification of this particular evolution process.
Stylized Patterns of Interdependence and the Social Multiplier
From an empirical perspective, the challenge is to characterize the unobserved social network on basis of outcome data alone. Whereas research by Jackson and Wolinski (1996) and Bala and Goyal (2000) has shown how assumptions on individual decision making translate into stylized patterns of interdependence, less attention has been paid to what we coined in section 4 the inverse social interactions problem. Conditional on the network structure being of a mean field type (i.e. the Γ has zeros as diagonal and 1/(N − 1) as off-diagonal elements), some researchers however have been able to identify social interaction effects by comparing variation in outcomes at different levels of aggregation. Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) examine coefficients from regressions run at different levels of aggregation with underlying social interactions parameters. They refer to the social multiplier as the ratio of the group level coefficient to the individual level coefficient.
They show how this ratio depends on a number of stylized patterns of interdependence that have received particular attention by the social interactions literature.
In the simplest case, the expected value of the social multiplier equals
with N the number of individuals in the group and β a general interaction coefficient (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 2003, p. 347) .
The relationship between the interaction coefficient β and the social multiplier changes when the interactions are not mean field. Suppose for example that the interaction structure takes the form of an Erdös-Renyi random graph with (homogeneous) link probability p. 9
Thus, every pair of individuals is connected with probability p. For general N it is cumbersome to derive analytical expressions for the social multiplier because there now are 2
that occur with positive probability. For small N explicit expressions can be obtained. For example, for N = 3, the expected value of the social multiplier equals 10
Since the relationship between β and p is non-linear, they can in principle be identified separately.
Values of the social multiplier greater than 1 point to general comovements in outcomes within groups. Following Moffitt (2001) and Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) , we may distinguish sources other than endogenous interactions that may lead to simultaneity in outcomes, namely simultaneity that is due to proximity, sorting on observables, sorting on unobservables, and endogeneity of group membership. These factors potentially bias the estimate of the social multiplier upward and therefore have to be accounted for in any empirical analysis.
Sorting on observables may be modelled by assuming that across individuals belonging to a group, component k has a common term:
The extent of such dependence may be measured by the portion of variance that is accounted for by the common term,
This can be expressed directly in terms of the ingredients of the social interactions model above.
9 The Erdös-Renyi random graph model [Erdös and Renyi (1960) ] was first introduced into the economics literature by Kirman (1983) . Ioannides owes his fascination with that model to this piece of Alan Kirman's work.
10 Derivation available upon request. Note that S(3, 1) = 2+β 2−β and S(3, p) = 1 if β = 0, which is consonant with the expression on page 347 of Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) Sorting on unobservables may be modelled by assuming that individuals belonging to a group are affected by shocks, it =¯ +φ it , which are correlated with individual characteristics, that is¯ covaries with observable component k, with the extent of covariation measured by Cov(x k ,¯ )/Var(x k ). We note that our mixing matrix introduces exactly such a form of dependence across individual outcomes, but covariation with the observables may be easier to justify as being due to endogenous formation of groups.
The consequences of endogeneity of group membership may be expressed directly in terms of the results of endogenous networking above. That is, the adjacency matrix confers a dependence on the underlying stochastic structure that is very different from the case of exogenous network.
We may use the above model to solve for the dynamic evolution of the aggregate outcome
We can then examine the consequences of the different stylized patterns of dependence for the dependence of the aggregate outcome with individual outcomes, the components of Y t .
An advantage of our model is that we may solve explicitly under different assumptions about social interactions. In contrast, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) work with the case of global interactions (although they do allow for attenuation of social influence over social distance). Reworking the model so as to allow for both global and local interactions and in the presence of different stylized patterns of social interactions give us a distinctly different handle on the social multiplier. It also allows us to pose the question of whether we may identify the social interactions topology from observations on individual outcomes.
Conclusions
We conclude by first providing a brief summary. This paper examines social interactions when social networking may be endogenous. It employs a linear-quadratic model that accommodates contextual effects and endogenous interactions, that is local ones where individuals react to the decisions of their neighbors, and global ones, where individuals react to the mean decision in the economy, both with a lag. Unlike the simple V AR(1) form of the structural model, the planner's problem involves intertemporal optimization and leads to a system of linear difference equations with expectations. It also highlights an asset-like property of socially optimal outcomes in every period which helps characterize the shadow values of connections among agents. Endogenous networking is easiest to characterize when individuals choose weights of social attachment to other agents. It is much harder to do so when networking is discrete. The paper also poses the inverse social interactions problem, that is whether it is possible to design a social network whose agents' decisions will obey an arbitrarily specified variance covariance matrix.
We would like to think of this paper as addressing problems that lie in the interface of two of Alan Kirman's areas of interest: economies with interacting agents and aggregation.
Kirman has himself summarized them very eloquently in a number of papers, including notably Kirman (1992; 1997; . The presence of non-market interactions among agents makes aggregation a tricky venture.
We tried to show that there reasons to believe that non-market interactions need not be of the mean field type. In a nutshell, we have tried to address the endogeneity of the infrastructure of trade. In our model, agents are vying to choose a desirable set of others to be influenced from. We would like to think of this as a precursor to opening up routes for trading. That is a much harder problem, but one that promises attractive payoffs. When markets are incomplete, opening up new markets is a tricky business from the viewpoint of social welfare [Newbery and Stiglitz (1984) ]. Still, this is also one of the reasons why the type of phenomena that Alan Kirman has chosen to emphasize throughout his work are central to making economics more relevant and a better tool for understanding how societies function.
